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Say the Magic Words: Establishing a
Historically Informed Standard to
Prevent Partisanship from Shielding
Racial Gerrymanders from Federal
Judicial Review
Emily K. Dalessio*
Abstract
In its 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, the
Supreme Court closed the doors of the federal courts to litigants
claiming a violation of their constitutional rights based on
partisan gerrymandering. In Rucho, the Court held that
partisan gerrymandering presents a political question that falls
outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts. However, the
Supreme Court did not address an insidious consequence of this
ruling: namely, that map-drawers may use partisan rationales
to obscure what is otherwise an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander. This Note uses North Carolina as an example of a
state with a long history of gerrymandering—both racial and
partisan. Over the course of the last quarter century, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down North Carolina’s
redistricting efforts as the product of racial gerrymandering.
Nonetheless, when the State changed its strategy, arguing that it
based its redistricting efforts on partisan goals, the Supreme
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Court in Rucho ultimately declined to review the
constitutionality of the map, allowing it to stand. This leaves
voters potentially unable to challenge redistricting where, as is
the case in North Carolina, race and political behavior are
closely aligned and the map-drawers claim that the map was
designed to secure partisan advantage, even if racial
demographics were central to their considerations. In effect,
Rucho creates a “magic words” test that incentivizes
map-drawers to sanitize the legislative record of references to
race, in favor of references to partisanship, in order to insulate
redistricting plans from federal judicial review.
This Note suggests that the Supreme Court adopt a test to
distinguish between racial and partisan gerrymandering using
the approach the Court took in Flowers v. Mississippi—another
2019 decision. In Flowers, the Court placed great emphasis on
Mississippi’s history of racial discrimination in jury selection in
finding that the State had again violated the Equal Protection
Clause in the case before it. Applying that logic to the issue of
gerrymandering, this Note proposes a test that would presume
that a challenged map from a state with a history of racial
gerrymandering was a product of racial gerrymandering. The
State would then face a high burden to rebut that presumption
before the reviewing court could decide whether the case presents
a political question under Rucho. The test this Note proposes
would safeguard the right to vote, especially for Black and
minority voters in states with histories of voter suppression and
in so doing, ensure that the fundamentals of the democratic
process are not subject to further erosion.
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Introduction

“To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is
that much less a citizen.”1 As such, voting rights receive special
protections under the Fourteenth2 and Fifteenth3 Amendments
to the Constitution, as well as under the Voting Rights Act
(VRA).4 Despite these protections and guarantees, the right to
vote currently stands on uneven ground.5 This is particularly
true in states like North Carolina, where a long history of racial
gerrymandering has morphed into a recent history of partisan
gerrymandering,6 creating a landscape in which legislators
1. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
3. See id. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
4. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
5. See John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes
Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan
Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 505 (2002) (indicating that a “green
light for partisan gerrymandering” could undo the accomplishments of the
Warren Court with regard to reapportionment).
6. See Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding
plaintiff-voters stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause where they
claimed North Carolina’s reapportionment scheme was “so irrational on its
face that it [could] be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into
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choose their voters rather than voters choosing their
representatives.7
This Note explores issues of racial and partisan
gerrymandering in the United States, using North Carolina8 as
a case study. In particular, this Note focuses on the actual and
potential impacts of the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Rucho
v. Common Cause,9 in which the Court held that partisan
gerrymandering is a non-justiciable political question.10 This
Note seeks to provide an answer to a question left unaddressed
in Rucho: how can federal courts ensure that states with a long
history of racial gerrymandering do not disguise

separate voting districts because of their race”); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517
U.S. 899, 904–18 (1996) (holding that the reapportionment of voters in North
Carolina’s District 12 violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act because the State’s classification of voters by race was
“not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”); Hunt v. Cromartie
(Cromartie I), 526 U.S. 541, 553–54 (1999) (finding insufficient evidence that
North Carolina’s 1997 redistricting of District 12 was racially gerrymandered);
Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001) (holding that
racial considerations did not predominate the 1997 redesign of District 12);
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481–82 (2017) (upholding “the District
Court’s conclusions that racial considerations predominated in designing both
[Congressional] District 1 and District 12”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.
Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (finding that the North Carolina congressional
district map was the result of partisan gerrymandering, which is not
justiciable under the political question doctrine).
7. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the North Carolina partisan gerrymanders “enabled
politicians to entrench themselves in office as against voters’ preferences”).
8. See Michael J. Pitts, What Has Twenty-Five Years of Racial
Gerrymandering Doctrine Achieved?, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 229, 242 (2018)
(indicating that North Carolina is an appropriate state to use to study racial
gerrymandering because its “congressional districts have seen more racial
gerrymandering litigation at the Supreme Court level than any other districts
in the country”).
9. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
10. See id. at 2506–07 (majority opinion) (“We conclude that partisan
gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the
federal courts.”).
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unconstitutional racial gerrymandering11 as partisan
gerrymandering in order to escape judicial review? 12
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Rucho speaks directly to what is
at
stake
in
instances
of
racial
and
partisan
gerrymandering—“[gerrymandering] deprive[s] citizens of the
most fundamental of their constitutional rights: the right to
participate equally in the political process, to join with others to
advance political beliefs, and to choose their political
representatives.”13 For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of voting “as a fundamental political
right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”14 In the absence
of federal judicial review this essential democratic right is
without the protections that it warrants.15
Rucho’s holding that partisan gerrymandering is a
non-justiciable political question16 creates an incentive for
legislatures redrawing congressional district maps to disguise
racial gerrymandering as partisan gerrymandering.17
Legislators can do this by ensuring that there is little to no
direct or circumstantial evidence in their records demonstrating

11. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463–64 (2017) (stating that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state
from “‘separating its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race’”
without a compelling justification (quoting Bethune-Hills v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017))).
12. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07 (concluding that partisan
gerrymandering does not present an issue suitable for federal judicial review
under Article III of the Constitution).
13. Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
14. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
15. See id. (stating that voting rights are among those rights “secured by
those maxims of constitutional law” and are fundamental); Rucho, 139 S. Ct.
at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (referring to “the rights to participate equally
in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to
choose their political representatives” as “the most fundamental of [citizens’]
constitutional rights”).
16. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07.
17. See id. at 2523 n.5 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In districting cases no less
than others, officials respond to what this Court determines the law to
sanction.”).
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that race was the dominant factor motivating redistricting.18
Thus, federal courts need a standard by which to hold
legislatures accountable when partisan motivation becomes a
thin veil for racial motivation—particularly in states whose
legislatures have historically played a game of trial and error
with racial and partisan gerrymanders to gain an entrenched
political advantage.19 This Note provides that standard.
Specifically, this Note argues that the Court should utilize
the same equal protection intervention it applied in another
2019 decision: Flowers v. Mississippi.20 In Flowers, the Court
placed great emphasis on the defendant’s historical evidence of
racial discrimination in the context of juror selection, both with
regard to recent patterns and long-term practice.21 Similar
considerations of history and practice are justified with respect
to voting rights, which have historically been the subject of deep
racial discrimination in states like North Carolina. 22 This Note
posits that where a plaintiff bringing a gerrymandering claim
can show a recent and long-standing history of a
state-defendant’s impermissible use of race in drawing district
lines, an evaluating federal court should presume that the
gerrymandering is based on race rather than partisanship.23
18. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (indicating that even where
some evidence of racial consideration in redistricting is present, the overall
scheme may be constitutional); David Daley, The Secret Files of the Master of
Modern Republican Gerrymandering, NEW YORKER (Sept. 6, 2019)
https://perma.cc/57MU-W6VE (“[Dr. Thomas Hofeller,] known as the master
of the modern gerrymander, trained . . . G.O.P. operatives and legislators
nationwide to secure their computer networks, guard access to their maps, and
never send e-mails that they didn’t want to see published by the news media.”).
19. See cases cited supra note 6 (evidencing North Carolina’s history of
gerrymandering, beginning with unconstitutional racial gerrymanders,
followed by the same districts being redrawn and upheld as seeking partisan
advantage).
20. 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019). For further discussion of Flowers v.
Mississippi, see infra Part V.
21. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2245 (indicating that a judge may consider a
“wide net” of historical evidence of racial discrimination in the context of
allegations of discriminatory peremptory strikes).
22. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993) (noting the “long history of
official racial discrimination in North Carolina’s political system”); see also
infra Part III.
23. See infra Part V.
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The state-defendant would then have an opportunity to rebut
the presumption of racial gerrymandering before it could move
to dismiss based on the Rucho political question holding.24 This
test would prevent Rucho from shielding racial gerrymanders
from judicial review merely because a state used partisanship
as “magic words” to avoid scrutiny from the federal judiciary.25
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides background
information on redistricting law and the VRA,26 which aids in
understanding the issues of racial and partisan gerrymandering
addressed by the rest of this Note. Part III presents a case study
of a quarter century of gerrymandering jurisprudence in North
Carolina. This section explores important issues and themes
presented in each case, which inform the analysis in Parts IV
and V.27 Part IV discusses the Supreme Court’s majority and
dissenting opinions in Rucho v. Common Cause and identifies
the problem Rucho creates in instances where partisan
gerrymandering clearly has a strong racial component. Finally,
Part V examines the Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning in
Flowers v. Mississippi. Part V goes on to propose a solution that
would allow the federal courts to have a continued role in
ensuring that voting rights, which are so fundamental to our
system of democracy, are not subject to further degradation.
II.

Redistricting Law and the Voting Rights Act

This section explores the constitutional and statutory
framework underlying the claims of racial and partisan
gerrymandering presented in Parts III and IV of this Note. 28 An
understanding of this background material further supports the
workability of the solution presented in Part V.29

24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part V; see also Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238, 269 (N.C.
2014) (Beasley, J., dissenting) (cautioning against a “magic words” test to
determine whether gerrymandering was based on race or partisanship).
26. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Parts III, IV.
29. See infra Part V.
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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Fifteenth Amendment provide the constitutional basis
for claims of vote dilution,30 including racial gerrymandering.31
“[T]he concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed
as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the
same relation to the governmental action questioned or
challenged.”32 This understanding of equal protection with
regard to voting rights is drawn from the Court’s decision in
Gray v. Sanders,33 in which the Court laid down the concept of
“one person, one vote” (OPOV). 34 When states afford individual
votes different weights based on the geographic location of that
voter, the state generally violates the OPOV doctrine.35
Supplementing the Constitution’s protections, the Voting
Rights Act, “statutorily prohibits redistricting legislation that
results in racial vote dilution (regardless of intent) or, in some
jurisdictions, redistricting legislation that causes a
retrogression in minority voters’ ability to elect their candidate

30. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2513 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (defining vote dilution as “the devaluation of one citizen’s vote as
compared to others”).
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); Michael Parsons,
Clearing the Political Thicket: Why Political Gerrymandering for Partisan
Advantage Is Unconstitutional, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1107, 1113 (2016)
(“The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits legislatures from engaging in two
forms of racial gerrymandering: intentional racial vote dilution . . . and racial
sorting.”).
32. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
33. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
34. Id. at 381.
35. See Wesbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that Article
I, § 2 of the Constitution “means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”); Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973) (interpreting Reynolds v. Sims as meaning
that in states with a bicameral legislature both houses must be “apportioned
substantially on a population basis”); Parsons, supra note 31, at 1109
(referring to state violations of OPOV as “quantitative vote dilution”).
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of choice.”36 Section 2 of the VRA, as amended in 1982,37
prohibits vote dilution.38 Vote dilution occurs where minority
voters “have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.”39
In Thornburg v. Gingles40 the Court construed Section 2 of
the VRA for the first time after the 1982 amendments. 41 Gingles
primarily concerned the North Carolina General Assembly’s
1982 redistricting plan for state legislative elections. 42 Black
voters challenged one single-member and six multi-member
districts,43 claiming that the districting frustrated their ability
to elect representatives of their choosing under Section 2 of the
VRA.44
The crux of a claim under Section 2, according to the
Supreme Court, is “that a certain electoral law, practice, or
structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause
an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [B]lack and
36. Parsons, supra note 31, at 1113; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 52
U.S.C.); see infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
37. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat.
131 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
38. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (“[Congress] amended § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act to prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a
minority group’s voting strength, regardless of the legislature’s intent.”);
Parsons, supra note 31, at 1119 (explaining that the VRA prohibits “two
different redistricting offenses: dilution and retrogression”).
39. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); Parsons, supra note 31, at 1119 (describing the
prohibitions of the VRA).
40. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
41. Id. at 34.
42. See id. at 34–35, 46 (noting the plaintiffs’ allegations that “the
legislative decision to employ multimember, rather than single-member,
districts . . . dilutes their votes by submerging them in a white majority”).
43. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616–17 (1982) (defining
multi-member districts as those that “tend to minimize the voting strength of
minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all
representatives of the district”). “[In these districts a] distinct [racial]
minority . . . may be unable to elect any representative in an . . . election, yet
may be able to elect several representatives [in corresponding single-member
districts].” Id.
44. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id.
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[W]hite voters to elect their preferred representatives.”45 For a
claim of vote dilution through multi-member districts to be
challenged successfully “a bloc voting majority must usually be
able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive,
geographically insular minority group.”46 In order to make this
showing, the minority group must demonstrate that it is large
and compact enough to command a majority in a single-member
district, because, if it is not, then the alleged dilution could not
be remedied by redrawing district lines to create a
single-member district.47 Challengers must further show that
the minority group is “politically cohesive” and that in the
absence of special circumstances, the white majority votes as a
bloc, enabling majority voters to defeat a minority candidate.48
If the challengers are able to establish that the Gingles
requirements are met, the court will evaluate whether a
violation of Section 2 has occurred based on the totality of the
circumstances.49
States attempting to comply with Section 2 of the VRA must
therefore examine the demographic breakdown in a particular
region to determine “where minority groups are sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a numerical
majority in a hypothetical district.”50 In these areas the state
must ensure that minority voters have an equal opportunity to
elect representatives of their choice.51
45. Id. at 47.
46. Id. at 49.
47. See id. at 50 (explaining the requirement for a sufficiently large and
geographically compact minority group); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40
(1993) (indicating that the first Gingles factor is “needed to establish that the
minority has the potential to elect a representative of its own choice in some
single-member district”).
48. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 (providing the test for vote dilution
violations of Section 2 of the VRA).
49. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2009) (“In a § 2 case,
only when a party has established the Gingles requirements does a court
proceed to analyze whether a violation has occurred based on the totality of
the circumstances.”).
50. See Parsons, supra note 31, at 1120 (explaining the process by which
states can comply with Section 2 of the VRA).
51. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (describing the type
of conduct and voting conditions that violate Section 2 of the VRA).
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One districting method that, where applicable, satisfies the
requirements of Section 2 is the creation of majority-minority
districts.52 Majority-minority districts are those in which a
racial minority composes a “numerical, working majority of the
voting-age population.”53 Where racially polarized voting is
prevalent, the creation of a majority-minority district may be
required to ensure that minority voters retain their voting
strength under Section 2.54 As the Court in Bartlett v.
Strickland55 explained, “[t]he special significance, in the
democratic process, of a majority means it is a special wrong
when a minority group has 50 percent or more of the voting
population and could constitute a compact voting majority but,
despite racially polarized bloc voting, that group is not put into
a district.”56 However, Bartlett also indicates that where voting
is not racially polarized, in so-called “crossover districts,”57
Section 2 does not entitle minority voters to the creation of
majority-minority districts.58
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v.
Holder,59 Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA required “covered”
jurisdictions—including districts with a history of racial
gerrymandering—to obtain pre-clearance from either the
Attorney General or a three-judge federal district court for any

52. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 18 (stating that the majority-minority rule
“provides straightforward guidance to courts and to those officials charged
with drawing district lines to comply with § 2”).
53. Id. at 13.
54. See Parsons, supra note 31, at 1120 (indicating that Strickland may
impose a requirement for the creation of majority-minority districts where
racially polarized voting is “stark”).
55. 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
56. Id. at 19.
57. See id. at 13 (defining “crossover districts” as those in which “the
minority population [is not the majority but], at least potentially, is large
enough to elect the candidate of its choice with help from voters who are
members of the majority and who cross over to support the minority’s
preferred candidate”).
58. See id. at 23–24 (indicating that majority-minority districts are
required only where the Gingles factors and the totality of the circumstances
mandate that result, and that in the alternative, crossover districts are
permissible).
59. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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change in the jurisdiction’s voting procedures.60 In other words,
Section 5 prohibited changes that “would lead to a retrogression
in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise” in covered jurisdictions. 61 In
order to determine whether a change in voting procedures would
cause a retrogression, courts compared the proposed voting
practice to current practice to determine whether the change
had the purpose or effect of compromising the right to vote based
on race.62
In 2010, Shelby County, Alabama sued the United States
Attorney General, claiming that Section 4 of the VRA was
unconstitutional because it was not justified by the current
voting conditions in covered jurisdictions.63 The Supreme Court
agreed and held unconstitutional the coverage formula that
Congress established in Section 4 of the VRA to determine
which districts required pre-clearance.64 In doing so, the Court
abrogated one of the most significant voting rights protections
of the twentieth century.65
The Court’s approach to the issue presented in Shelby
County is relevant to the analysis of North Carolina’s
gerrymandering jurisprudence.66 In Shelby County, the
Attorney General argued that because the coverage formula was
responsive to the “extraordinary problem” of discrimination in
60. See id. at 537 (describing the preclearance requirements under
Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA) (citing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c(b)–(d) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304)).
61. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
62. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883–84 (1994) (describing the test
for retrogression under Section 5 of the VRA); Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp.
3d 600, 605 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (stating the purpose of Section 5 of the VRA).
63. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 540–42.
64. See id. at 556–57 (indicating that Congress had relied on
forty-year-old data to create its coverage formula, and its failure to update the
coverage formula to match current conditions rendered the formula
unconstitutional).
65. See id. at 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Throwing out preclearance
when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes
is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting
wet.”); Editorial, The Voters Abandoned by the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016,
at A26 (arguing the Shelby County decision “set back the cause of racial
equality at the voting booth by decades”).
66. See infra Part V.
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voting at the time it was enacted in 1965, its continued use was
justified so long as any discrimination remained in the covered
jurisdictions with respect to voting rights.67 The Attorney
General rested his position on the long-standing history of
race-based voter discrimination and suppression.68 However,
the Court was not satisfied with these arguments because
“history did not end in 1965.”69 The Court in Shelby County thus
signaled that pre-VRA history was not enough to uphold the
safeguards of Sections 4 and 5, but that evidence of pre-VRA
discrimination paired with recent and continuing post-VRA
discrimination, could justify voting rights protections.70
As will be discussed in Part V of this Note, a similar
consideration of a state’s record on racial and partisan
gerrymandering, both recent and long-standing, is required in
order to prevent the erosion of the fundamental right to elect
representatives of one’s choosing.71 Based on the implications of
the Court’s decision in Shelby County, the combination of a
recent and long-standing history of discrimination should be
enough to trigger the voting rights safeguards that this Note
proposes in Part V.72

67. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 552.
68. See id. at 552–53 (stating that the Government relied on the South’s
history of slavery before the Civil War and Jim Crow policies but did not
consider the improved modern landscape of voting rights in the South).
69. See id. at 552 (“In assessing the current need for a preclearance
system that treats States differently from one another today, [the post-VRA]
history cannot be ignored.”).
70. See id. at 557 (“Our country has changed, and while any racial
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the
legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”).
71. See infra Part V.
72. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (indicating that
extraordinary remedies, like the protections under Sections 4 and 5 of the
VRA, can only be justified when there are current needs).
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III. A Case Study of Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering in
North Carolina

Racial gerrymandering is not always easy to distinguish
from
partisan
gerrymandering.73
North
Carolina’s
congressional districting map,74 which has been the subject of
over a quarter century of litigation surrounding issues of racial
and partisan gerrymandering,75 serves as an apt example of the
often-narrow line between motivations for gerrymandering.76
A.

From Shaw to Cromartie I

The long and winding story of racial and partisan
gerrymandering in North Carolina begins with Shaw v. Reno
(Shaw I).77 In Shaw I, the Supreme Court evaluated a claim of

73. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (describing the “difficulty of
determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it
purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race”) (citing Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 11 (1964)); Ely, supra note 5, at 498 (stating that the
“predominant purpose” test used in Cromartie II is problematic where political
purposes and racial-motivated purposes are “inextricably intertwined,” as
they were in Cromartie II); see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484,
2492 (2019) (defining gerrymandering as the packing of voters of a certain race
or political affiliation into one district so they win by a large margin, “wasting”
votes that would improve their chances in others, or cracking a group across
multiple districts such that it fails to create a majority in any district).
74. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 240 n.76 (explaining that the political party
in power in the North Carolina General Assembly gains control of the State’s
congressional redistricting process and that the governor does not play a role
in redistricting).
75. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
76. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646 (“[R]edistricting differs from other kinds
of state decisionmaking in that the legislature is always aware of race when it
draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and
political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors.”); Pitts, supra
note 8, at 242 (noting that North Carolina’s congressional districts have been
the subject of more racial gerrymandering litigation in the Supreme Court
than any other state districting maps).
77. See Shaw I, 509 U.S at 633–34 (describing the plaintiff-voters’ claim
that North Carolina’s reapportionment plan “which contain[ed] district
boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitute[d] an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander”).
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racial gerrymandering for the first time.78 Five registered North
Carolina voters challenged the revised boundaries of North
Carolina Congressional District 1 and District 12, alleging they
were drawn using an unconstitutional consideration of race. 79
The North Carolina General Assembly drew the contested map
after the United States Attorney General rejected its first
attempt to draw district lines following the 1990 census, on VRA
grounds.80 The General Assembly’s purpose in drawing the
revised map was to allow Black voters to control the outcome of
the elections in District 1 and District 12.81 The revised map
that was the subject of Shaw I included two majority-minority
districts: District 1 and District 12.82
Immediately, the Court noted the odd shapes of District 1
and District 12.83 The Court described District 1 as “[c]entered
in the northeast portion of the state, it moves southward until
it tapers into a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions,
it reaches into the southernmost part of the State near the
South Carolina border.”84 District 12 was stranger still: “[i]t
winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial

78. Id. at 636; see Pitts, supra note 8, at 230 (indicating that the voters’
claims in Shaw I were the first claims of racial gerrymandering recognized by
the Court).
79. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 636–37 (“Appellants are five residents of
Durham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. Under
the General Assembly’s plan, two will vote . . . in District 12 and three will
vote in neighboring District 2.”).
80. See id. at 634–35 (explaining that the district map affected counties
located in areas covered by Section 5 of the VRA, so the map was subject to
review by the United States Attorney General who objected to the General
Assembly’s first attempt after the 1990 census); see also supra Part II.
81. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 230 (discussing the nature of the claims in
Shaw I).
82. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 635 (“[T]he General Assembly enacted a
revised redistricting plan, 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws, ch. 7, that included a
second majority-[B]lack district.”).
83. See id. (noting that District 12 was “even more unusually shaped”
than District 1).
84. Id.
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centers, and manufacturing areas ‘until it gobbles in enough
enclaves of [B]lack neighborhoods.’”85
The strangely-drawn boundary lines of District 1 and
District 12 raised the Court’s suspicions about the factors on
which the General Assembly relied.86 The Court recognized that
“[a] reapportionment plan that includes in one district
individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise
widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and
who may have little in common with one another but the color
of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid.”87 The Court went on to confirm its rejection of the
race-based stereotype that “members of the same racial
group . . . [regardless of other factors] think alike, share the
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at
the polls.”88 Under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence
this type of racial stereotyping was impermissible, spelling
trouble for the redistricting plan.89
In addition to its concern that racial gerrymandering
entrenches racial stereotypes, the Court reasoned that when
state legislatures create a district based primarily on the
perceived common interests of a particular racial group, elected
officials “are more likely to believe that their primary obligation
is to represent only the members of that group” rather than the
general electorate.90 Because this type of race-based political
incentive “is altogether antithetical to our system of
representative democracy” the Court concluded that
85. Id. at 635–36 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476–77
(E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part));
see Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting, WASH. POST
(Apr. 20, 1993), https://perma.cc/RER3-RSE5 (quoting a member of the North
Carolina Legislature describing District 12’s meandering path along
Interstate 85: “If you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you’d
kill most of the people in the district”).
86. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 641 (“It is unsettling how closely the North
Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past.”).
87. Id. at 647.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 647–48 (“We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as
impermissible racial stereotypes.” (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484
n.2 (1990))).
90. Id. at 648.
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a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the
Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that
the legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally
cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
separate voters into different districts on the basis of race,
and that that the separation lacks sufficient justification. 91

The majority decision in Shaw I established the standard
for this new judicial doctrine of racial gerrymandering under the
Equal Protection Clause and set the stage for the last
twenty-five years of gerrymandering challenges in North
Carolina, as well as in other states.92
Justice White, Justice Stevens, and Justice Souter each
authored a dissent. Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens and
Justice Souter, suggested that the racial gerrymandering in this
case should be treated similarly to other types of
gerrymandering, including political gerrymandering, and
therefore should not be subject to strict scrutiny, but rather a
less rigorous analysis.93 In his dissent, Justice Souter also
concluded that racial gerrymandering should not trigger strict
scrutiny because, unlike other types of race-based state actions,
“the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of
another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others.” 94
91. Id. at 649.
92. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 230 (“Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to
say that racial gerrymandering doctrine was to election law what Nirvana’s
‘Nevermind’ was to rock music during the 1990’s—the groundbreaking
moment of the decade.”).
93. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 662–63 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)
[E]ven assuming that racial (or political) factors were considered in
the drawing of district boundaries, a showing of discriminatory
effects is a “threshold requirement” in the absence of which there is
no equal protection violation, and no need to “reach the question of
the state interests . . . served by the particular districts.” (citing
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 142–43);
Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate
representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic
Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily
follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of
the very minority group whose history in the Unites States gave
birth to the Equal Protection Clause.
94. Id. at 681–82 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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However, the majority rejected these arguments because there
was no precedent requiring that partisan gerrymandering and
racial gerrymandering be subject to the same level of scrutiny.95
Rather, the majority relied on the troubling and persistent
history of racial discrimination in voting rights and its
“Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has
reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of
race” to justify its application of strict scrutiny in this case.96
The Supreme Court’s reliance on the history of racial
discrimination in Shaw I is relevant to this Note’s discussion of
partisan gerrymandering in a post-Rucho world.97 The history
of racial gerrymandering, and partisan gerrymandering with
racial undertones, brings forth similar concerns regarding the
overall fairness of reapportionment and representation in North
Carolina today.98
On remand, the three-judge district court again upheld the
districting plan.99 The Eastern District of North Carolina
concluded that race was the principal deciding factor in
determining where to draw the district boundaries, but that “the
legislation passe[d] strict scrutiny as a sufficiently narrowly
tailored effort by the state legislature to serve the State’s
compelling interest in complying with” the remedial
requirements of Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA.100
While the litigation surrounding this redistricting scheme
was slowly moving through the court system, North Carolina
held congressional elections using the challenged map in 1992
and 1994.101 In each of those elections, two out of the twelve
winning candidates were African Americans elected from

95. Id. at 650 (majority opinion).
96. See id. (addressing Justice Stevens’ and Justice Souter’s dissenting
opinions).
97. See infra Part V.
98. See infra Part V.
99. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
100. Id.
101. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 236 (describing the 1992 and 1994 elections
using the map precleared by the U.S. Justice Department).
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Districts 1 and 12 respectively.102 Despite these two elections,
the legal battle over Districts 1 and 12 was far from over.
The 1992 redistricting plan returned to the Supreme Court
in Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II).103 There, the Court recognized that
a state may use racial distinctions to remedy past racial
discrimination only when the discrimination is “identified
discrimination.”104 Discrimination is identifiable when it is
specific and where “the institution that [made] the racial
distinction . . . had a ‘strong basis in evidence’ to conclude that
remedial action was necessary” before it made use of that
race-based distinction.105 The Supreme Court agreed with the
district court that the State had not presented sufficient
evidence that the map was drawn for primarily remedial
measures.106
Addressing the State’s argument that its race-based
redistricting satisfied strict scrutiny as an effort to comply with
the VRA, the Court noted that it had not yet addressed the
102. See id. at 235–36
The results of [the 1994] election were the same as the 1992 election
in terms of the delegation’s racial composition, as two of the
candidates were African American. However, the partisan
composition of the delegation changed dramatically, jumping from
four to eight Republican members, following the national trend of
the so-called “Republican Revolution.”
103. 517 U.S. 899 (1996); see 28 U.S.C. § 2285 (“A district court of three
judges shall be convened when . . . an action is filed challenging the
constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the
apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (“Except
as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from . . . [a] suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges.”).
104. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 909 (“‘While the States and their
subdivisions may take remedial action when they possess evidence’ of past or
present discrimination, ‘they must identify that discrimination, public or
private, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.’”
(quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989))).
105. Id. at 910 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277
(1986)).
106. See id. at 910–12 (“[T]here is little to suggest that the legislature
considered the historical events and social-science data that the reports [on
past discrimination] recount . . . We certainly cannot say on the basis of these
reports that the District Court’s findings on this point were clearly
erroneous.”).
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question of whether compliance with the VRA could be a
compelling state interest.107 The Justices again avoided that
question, finding “that creating an additional majority-[B]lack
district was not required under a correct reading of § 5 and that
District 12, as drawn, [was] not a remedy narrowly tailored to
the State’s professed interest in avoiding § 2 liability.”108 While
holding that District 12 was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
North Carolina’s interest in complying with Section 2 of the
VRA,109 the Court did not reach the merits of the racial
gerrymandering claim as it pertained to District 1, finding that
the challengers lacked standing.110
The Supreme Court decided Shaw II in June of 1996, but
on remand the district court allowed the State to continue using
the unconstitutional map in 1996 elections.111 After the 1996
election, the North Carolina General Assembly made another
attempt at redistricting: its 1997 plan served as a “catalyst for
more lawsuits.”112

107. Id. at 911.
108. See id. at 911–15
“[A] State’s policy of adhering to other districting principles instead
of creating as many majority-minority districts as possible does not
support an inference that the plan so discriminates on the basis of
race or color as to violate the Constitution, and thus cannot provide
any basis under § 5 for the Justice Department’s objection.”
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924 (1995));
Pitts, supra note 8, at 236–37 (summarizing the Court’s reasoning in Shaw
II).
109. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 918.
110. See id. at 904 (explaining that because none of the plaintiffs resided
in District 1, they had no standing to challenge the boundary “absent specific
evidence that [they] personally had been subjected to a racial classification,”
which was not presented to the Court).
111. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to
Racial Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case
Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227, 261 (2001) (“The district court permitted
the State to hold the 1996 elections under the 1992 Plan, but enjoined further
use of the plan in future elections.”); Pitts, supra note 8, at 237 (stating that
the 1996 elections, held using the map declared unconstitutional in Shaw II,
produced Black congresspeople from District 1 and District 12 again and an
even 6-6 partisan split).
112. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 111, at 262.
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In response to the Court’s decisions in Shaw I and Shaw II
striking down the 1992 congressional map as an impermissible
racial gerrymander,113 the North Carolina General Assembly
enacted a new districting plan (1997 map).114 The General
Assembly intended the 1997 map to remedy the constitutional
shortcomings of the 1992 map—namely that the map
impermissibly drew district boundaries to create majority-Black
districts.115 The new District 12 was no longer a
majority-minority district, and rather than splitting ten
counties, the new District 12 only touched six.116 Although the
1997 map produced a District 12 that was wider and shorter
than the 1992 version, it “retain[ed] its basic ‘snakelike’ shape
and continu[ed] to track Interstate-85.”117 Residents of District
1 joined the Shaw plaintiffs from District 12 to challenge the
1997 map on the theory that, like the 1992 map, race
predominated the drawing of congressional district
boundaries.118 The three-judge district court ruled on the
parties’ competing motions for summary judgment and granted
the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction prohibiting the use of the
1997 map in the North Carolina’s upcoming general election.119
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that while the
plaintiff-appellees’ evidence supported the argument that the
General Assembly had an impermissible racial motive when it

113. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
114. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541, 543 (1999) (citing 1997 N.C. Sess.
Laws, ch. 11) (stating that the State enacted the 1997 redistricting plan in
response to the Court’s decision in Shaw II).
115. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 111, at 262 (“The General
Assembly’s stated purpose in enacting this new plan was to cure the
constitutional defects of the 1992 Plan and preserve the existing partisan
balance in the North Carolina congressional delegation.”).
116. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 544 (explaining that Black voters
accounted for 46 percent of registered voters in the 1997 iteration of District
12 and describing the boundaries of District 12).
117. Id. (citation omitted).
118. See Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407, 409 (E.D.N.C. 2000)
(describing the events that led to the State’s appeal to the Supreme Court in
Cromartie I).
119. See Cromartie v. Hunt, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1029–30 (E.D.N.C. 1998)
(granting the plaintiff’s request for an injunction).
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drew the 1997 map, that evidence was not uncontroverted.120
The State-appellants asserted that “the General Assembly drew
its district lines with the intent to make District 12 a strong
Democratic district” and to “protect incumbents, to adhere to
traditional districting criteria, and preserve the existing
partisan balance in the State’s congressional delegation, which
in 1997 was composed of six Republicans and six Democrats.”121
In other words, the State argued the 1997 map was motivated
by partisan, not racial, considerations.
The Supreme Court agreed that because North Carolina’s
Black voters overwhelmingly voted Democratic,122 it was not
simple to distinguish a partisan motivation to create a
Democrat-controlled district from an impermissible racial
motivation based on evidence of voter registration rather than
voting behavior.123 Because the General Assembly’s motivation
is an issue of fact,124 and because that motivation was still in
dispute before the Supreme Court, the Court remanded the case
to the district court for a full assessment of the General
Assembly’s motivations.125

120. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 548–49 (indicating that most of the
evidence presented by the plaintiffs was circumstantial evidence showing that
the 1997 map had “low scores with respect to traditional measures of
compactness” and that the plaintiffs had “presented no direct evidence of
intent” to draw boundaries based on race).
121. Id. at 549.
122. See id. at 550 (agreeing with the affidavit of Dr. David W. Peterson,
an expert witness for the State, who reviewed racial demographics and party
affiliation and compared the results to election data to discern the correlation
between race and partisan preference); Party Affiliation Among Adults in
North
Carolina
by
Race/Ethnicity,
PEW RSCH. CTR.
(2014),
https://perma.cc/NDX2-3FUX (showing that 79 percent of Black voters polled
were affiliated with the Democratic Party in 2014).
123. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 550 (stating that Dr. Peterson’s analysis
strengthened the inference that the General Assembly was motivated by
politics rather than race).
124. See id. (“The legislature’s motivation is itself a factual question.”).
125. See id. at 551
[A]ppellees were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Our
prior decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in
constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that
the most loyal Democrats happen to be [B]lack Democrats and even
if the State were conscious of that fact.
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Cromartie II: Gerrymandering for a New Millennium

Having learned the lessons of the Supreme Court’s
twentieth century racial gerrymandering jurisprudence, the
North Carolina General Assembly began the millennium with a
new and successful strategy to justify its 1997 district map:
drawing district lines to ensure partisan advantage.126
On remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in Cromartie
I, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina found that race was the General Assembly’s
predominant motivation in drawing the boundaries of both
Congressional District 1 and District 12.127 However, the court
found that the 1997 map’s District 1 satisfied strict scrutiny
because “[t]here was a compelling state interest in obtaining
pre-clearance under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the
1st District was narrowly tailored to meet [that] interest.”128
The district court went on to find the ever-problematic District
12 was facially race motivated,129 and that there was no
compelling state interest to justify the racial motivation.130
Accordingly, the district court held that District 12 was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.131

126. See Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999) (rejecting
plaintiff-appellees’ claims of impermissible racial gerrymandering based on
evidence that the legislators “in crafting their districting law, . . . attempted
to protect incumbents, to adhere to traditional districting criteria, and to
preserve the existing partisan balance in the State’s congressional delegation,
which in 1997 was composed of six Republicans and six Democrats”);
Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (finding the district court’s conclusion
that the legislature relied on race rather than politics to draw the 1997 map
was clearly erroneous because “race in this case correlates closely with
political behavior”).
127. Cromartie, 133 F. Supp. 2d. at 420, 423.
128. Id. at 423.
129. See id. at 420 (“It is clear that the Twelfth District was drawn to
collect precincts with high racial identification rather than political
identification. Additionally, the evidence demonstrates that . . . more heavily
Democratic precincts . . . were bypassed in the drawing of District 12 in favor
of precincts with a higher African-American population.”).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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District 12 returned to the Supreme Court for the fourth
time in Cromartie II.132 The Court framed the challenger’s
burden rigorously, stating that in order to successfully claim
that the General Assembly impermissibly relied on race, the
plaintiff-appellees had to show “at a minimum that the
‘legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles . . . to racial considerations’”133 and that race was “the
predominant factor” motivating the districting decision.134 The
Court further qualified its analysis based on deference to the
State legislature’s competence in the area of redistricting,135
particularly in this case “where the State ha[d] articulated a
legitimate political explanation for its districting decision, and
the voting population is one in which race and political
affiliation are highly correlated.”136
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer concluded that the
evidence presented at the district court did not support the
plaintiff-appellees’ “‘race not politics’ thesis.”137 Although the
evidence showed that the General Assembly did consider race,138
it also clearly considered geographical and political factors.139
Thus, the evidence of racial consideration did not establish that
“race played a predominant role comparatively speaking.”140
The majority went on to articulate a standard by which
voters could bring a challenge to districting maps on racial and
132. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
133. Id. at 241 (“[T]he burden of proof on the plaintiffs (who attack the
district) is a ‘demanding one.’” (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928
(1995))).
134. Id. (citing Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 547).
135. See id. at 242 (“[T]he underlying districting decision is one that
ordinarily falls within a legislature’s sphere of competence.”).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 255 (stating that the plaintiff-appellees’ evidence that there
were reliably Democratic majority-White counties that could have been used
to achieve partisan balance was not sufficient to support their claim of racial
gerrymandering).
138. See id. at 253–54 (referring to legislative redistricting leader
then-Senator Roy Cooper’s 1997 testimony that the legislature drew the map
with “race in mind,” and an email a legislative staff member sent to Senator
Cooper, referring to moving the “Greensboro Black community into the 12th”).
139. Id. at 253.
140. Id.
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partisan grounds in cases where majority-minority districts are
at issue and race tends to correlate highly with political
affiliation.141
[T]he party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries
must show at the least that the legislature could have
achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative
ways that are comparably consistent with traditional
districting principles. That party must also show that those
districting alternatives would have brought about
significantly greater racial balance.142

Despite the “modicum of evidence” supporting the district
court’s conclusion,143 the Court in Cromartie II determined that
because race and political behavior were closely correlated in
this case and because the plaintiffs had not made the required
showing under the Court’s new test, the district court’s
conclusion was clearly erroneous.144
The Court’s decision in Cromartie II drew some scholarly
attention. John Hart Ely questioned the majority’s reasoning
that Black voters were moved from one district to another
because they were reliable Democratic voters.145 Ely alludes to
the likely pretextual use of partisanship as a motivation,
wondering “why if [politics] had been the point of the selections
in question, they were described by those who made them in
racial terms.”146 He also takes issue with the Court’s rule that
racial gerrymandering is established where “race rather
than . . . political behavior”147 predominated.148 According to
141. See id. at 258 (noting that this standard also applies to “approximate
equivalent[s]” of majority-minority districts).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 257.
144. Id. at 257–58 (“The basic question is whether the legislature drew
District 12’s boundaries because of race rather than because of political
behavior (coupled with traditional nonracial districting considerations).”).
145. See Ely, supra note 5, at 495 (stating that the Court’s prior decisions
striking down racial gerrymanders make it “difficult to imagine what could
have been thought the gain in dressing political motives in the language of
race”).
146. Id.
147. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001).
148. Ely, supra note 5, at 496.
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Ely, this distinction is difficult to make because, while it can be
hard to even discern one’s own predominant purpose for one’s
actions, “attempting to determine the ‘predominant purpose’ of
the
North
Carolina
legislature . . . compounds
the
impossibility.”149 Thus, according to Ely, Cromartie II was
wrongly decided and problematic for the Court’s
gerrymandering jurisprudence.150
According to other scholars, Cromartie II signaled the
Court’s retreat “from strictly policing the boundaries of racial
gerrymandering . . . [and] thereby signaled its commitment to
race consciousness and descriptive representation at the
expense of its anticlassification jurisprudence.”151 Cromartie II,
thus,
provided a safe harbor of sorts for the states when they drew
majority-minority districts. As long as they could plausibly
claim those districts were drawn for partisan reasons—and
given the correlation between racial and political identity,
that claim can almost always be made—the states are likely
to prevail against claims of racial gerrymandering.152

The Cromartie II decision therefore, began to set the stage
for the problem addressed in this Note: namely, after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, if the
Court muddles the distinction between racial and partisan
gerrymandering, apparent partisanship becomes an effective
shield from judicial review for redistricting that might
otherwise be classified as racial gerrymandering.153
After the Court’s decision in Cromartie II, the first decade
of the new millennium was a quiet period for North Carolina

149. Id.
150. See id. at 490 (arguing that the majority’s finding of clear error was
itself erroneous and that the Court’s decision in Cromartie II implicitly
approved of racial stereotyping in partisan gerrymandering claims).
151. Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and Representation
Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559, 1585 (2018).
152. Id. at 1578–79.
153. See infra Part V.
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redistricting litigation.154 During that period, Democrats held
six to eight of North Carolina’s congressional seats and the
district boundaries were not challenged in court.155
In the 2010 election cycle, Republicans gained control of the
North Carolina General Assembly for the “first time since 1870,
thus securing control of the redistricting process.” 156 The
Republicans “inherited a political scene” where Democrats,
including two African-American Democrats, held a narrow
majority—seven out of thirteen congressional seats. 157
After redrawing the district map in 2011,158 in the 2012
election Republicans won nine out of thirteen congressional
seats, despite only garnering 49.1 percent of the popular vote.159
In 2014, the Republicans further entrenched their majority,
winning ten out of thirteen seats with 55.8 percent of the
popular vote.160
The method the Republican leaders, North Carolina State
Senator Robert Rucho and State Representative David Lewis,
154. See Pitts, supra note 8, at 239 (stating that during this period “[t]he
Democratic Party[, which] again controlled the redistricting process, drew two
districts (District 1 and 12) to allow African-American voters to elect
candidates of choice”).
155. See JEFF TRANDAHL, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2, 2004 at 49–50 (2005),
https://perma.cc/YL26-WLMZ (PDF) (providing election results for the 2004
congressional election); LORRAINE C. MILLER, STATISTICS OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 7, 2006 at 34 (2007),
https://perma.cc/N7EX-27FH (PDF) (providing election results for the 2006
congressional election); LORRAINE C. MILLER, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 4, 2008 at 49 (2009),
https://perma.cc/E9LP-5DMD (PDF) (providing election results for the 2008
congressional elections); see also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465–66
(2017) (observing that the congressional districts drawn as a result of the 2000
census were not challenged in court).
156. Pitts, supra note 8, at 240.
157. Id.
158. See Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 607–08 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
(describing the 2011 redistricting process).
159. See Michael Kent Curtis, Using the Voting Rights Act to Discriminate:
North Carolina’s Use of Racial Gerrymanders, Two Racial Quotas, Safe
Harbors, Shields, and Inoculations to Undermine Multiracial Coalitions and
Black Political Power, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 421, 434–35 (2016) (calling the
2011 redistricting a Republican gerrymander).
160. Id. at 435.
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used to effectuate their gerrymander had a clear racial
component.161 In order to ensure compliance with Section 2 of
the VRA,162 Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis instructed
Dr. Thomas Hofeller, a private redistricting coordinator, to
“classify residents based on race so as to include a sufficient
number of [B]lack voters inside such districts, and consequently
exclude [W]hite voters from the districts, in an effort to achieve
a desired racial composition of >50% T[otal] B[lack] V[oting]
A[ge] P[opulation]” and proportionality between Black senators
and representatives and the Black voting-age population in the
state.163 The results of their efforts “neared quota perfection.”164
C.

Gerrymandering Round Three: District 12’s Fifth
Appearance Before the Supreme Court

In 2016, the 2011 map was successfully challenged in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina, which found that race was the predominant motivator
for the boundary lines of District 12.165 The court also found the
defendants’ purported rationale—that partisan objectives
predominated—unconvincing.166 Finally, the court noted that
“[t]o find that otherwise would create a ‘magic words’ test that
would put an end to these types of challenges,” namely that by
161. See id. at 436–37 (indicating that the Republicans successfully
engineered a quota system in which “the legislature was to have [B]lack
senators and representatives in proportion to the [B]lack-voting-age
population of the state . . . [while] creat[ing] as many as possible
[B]lack-majority districts with 50% plus T[otal] B[lack] V[oting] A[ge]
P[opulation]”).
162. See Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 608 (“[D]istricts created to comply with
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, must be created with a ‘Black Voting Age
Population’ (‘BVAP’), as reported by the Census, at the level of at least 50%
plus one.” (quoting a June 17, 2011 public statement by Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis)).
163. See Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d 238, 262–63 (N.C. 2014) (Beasley,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the same map at issue
in Harris).
164. Curtis, supra note 159, at 437.
165. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d. at 621–22 (“Traditional redistricting
principles such as compactness and contiguity were subordinated to this
goal.”).
166. Id. at 622.
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using “magic words” of partisanship, rather than race,
legislators could obscure racial gerrymanders as partisan
gerrymanders to escape strict scrutiny.167
The district court also held that District 1 was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.168 The court gave the legislature two weeks
to draft a remedial redistricting map to cure the racial
gerrymander.169 The revised map was again challenged in the
district court on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander.170 The court rejected the plaintiff-voters’
claims and allowed the 2016 election to proceed using the
remedial map.171 The 2016 election results were the same as the
2014 results—Republicans won ten out of thirteen available
seats.172
But the Harris v. McCrory173 plaintiffs were not done. In
2017, they appealed to the Supreme Court, which once again
determined that racial considerations predominated the

167. Id. (quoting Dickson, 766 S.E.2d. at 269 (Beasley, J., dissenting)); see
Dickson, 766 S.E.2d. at 269 (Beasley, J., dissenting)
To allow this serpentine district . . . to be drafted for political
advantage is a proxy for racial disenfranchisement and effectively
creates a “magic words” threshold. Upholding this district’s
tortured construction creates an incentive for legislators to stay “on
script” and avoid mentioning race on the record, and in this
instance, it is disingenuous to suggest that race is not the
predominant factor.
168. See id. at 611 (“CD 1 presents a textbook example of racial
predominance.
There
is
an
extraordinary
amount
of
direct
evidence—legislative records, public statements, instructions to Dr. Hofeller,
the ‘principal architect’ of the 2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan, and
testimony—that shows a racial quota, or floor, of 50-percent-plus-one-person
was established for CD 1.”).
169. Id. at 627.
170. Harris v. McCrory, No. 13-cv-949, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71853, at *6
(M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016) (quoting Representative Lewis, who led the remedial
map-drawing as saying “I acknowledge freely that this would be a political
gerrymander”).
171. Id. at *8.
172. Pitts, supra note 8, at 241–42.
173. No. 13-cv-949, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71853 (M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016).
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composition of District 1 and District 12.174 With respect to
District 1, the Court found that compliance with the VRA did
not require the racial quota system put in place by Senator
Rucho and Representative Lewis and therefore the district could
not withstand strict scrutiny.175
District 12 fared no better in “its fifth(!) appearance before
[the] Court.”176 The Supreme Court agreed with the district
court, finding that the leaders of the 2011 redistricting plan had
“repeatedly described the influx of African-Americans into
District 12 as a § 5 [of the VRA] compliance measure, not a
side-effect of political gerrymandering.”177 The Court’s reliance
on the General Assembly’s own description of its redistricting
decisions, which in this case were facially race-based, to
determine the nature of a particular gerrymander likely
signaled that sanitizing the record of references to race may
insulate map-drawers’ decisions from the Court’s most exacting
scrutiny.178
Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy dissented with regard to
District 12.179 In the dissenters’ view, the decision regarding
District 12 should have mirrored the decision in Cromartie II.180
Following that logic, where a state claims partisan goals were
the predominant motivating factor in redistricting, in the
dissenters’ view, the challengers must put forth an “alternative
174. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1482 (2017) (“[R]acial
considerations predominated in designing both District 1 and District
12. . . . For District 1, we further uphold the District Court’s decision that § 2
of the VRA gave North Carolina no good reason to reshuffle voters because of
their race.”).
175. Id. at 1472.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1478.
178. See infra Part V.
179. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1486 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
180. See id. at 1488–90
Cromartie II plainly meant to establish a rule for use in a broad
class of cases and not a rule to be employed one time only. . . . The
alternative-map requirement . . . is a logical response to the
difficult problem of distinguishing between racial and political
motivations when race and political party preference closely
correlate.
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redistricting map that served the legislature’s political objective
as well as the challenged version without producing the same
racial effects.”181 The dissent went on to rigorously scrutinize
the evidence before the Court, and concluded that the
mapmaker’s approach was consistent with the legislature’s
stated political motives.182 The dissent also found that the effect
of the redistricting on racial minorities was an inevitable
consequence of executing the map for Republican partisan
advantage,183 and that the majority “read[] far too much
into . . . references” of race from the leaders of the 2011 plan.184
Justices Alito and Kennedy therefore would have upheld
District 12 as an “unsavory”185 but permissible partisan
gerrymander.186
After a quarter century of litigation surrounding North
Carolina’s attempts to manipulate the electorate, the North
Carolina General Assembly was no doubt aware that the “basic
question [regarding constitutionality of a redistricting plan] is
whether the legislature drew . . . boundaries because of race
rather than because of political behavior.”187 The General
Assembly was also on notice that partisan gerrymanders were
likely to be upheld, so long as there were no obvious racial
references in the record.188 Taken together, these cases confirm
181. Id. at 1486.
182. See id. at 1492–94 (summarizing the evidence that the maps were
drawn to “maximize Republican opportunities”).
183. See id. at 1496 (“[S]o long as the legislature chose to retain the basic
shape of District 12 and to increase the number of Democrats in the district,
it was inevitable that the Democrats brought in would be disproportionately
[B]lack.”).
184. Id. at 1497.
185. Id. at 1487 (“Partisan gerrymandering is always unsavory, but that
is not the issue here.”).
186. Id. at 1504.
187. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001).
188. See id. at 257 (dismissing the challengers’ evidence that racial
considerations predominated the 1997 boundaries of District 12 because the
Court determined race and political behavior closely correlated); Cooper v.
Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1478 (2017) (relying on the General Assembly’s
references to race to find that the 2011 redistricting plan was a racial
gerrymander); id. at 1497 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority
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that even where there is some evidence that race played a role
in drawing district boundaries, the overall scheme may be
constitutional if a state legislature puts forth evidence that
political concerns were the primary motivator.189 The Court
went on to decide Rucho v. Common Cause against this tangled
backdrop of partisan and racial gerrymandering jurisprudence
spanning a quarter century.190
IV. Rucho v. Common Cause and the Justiciability of Partisan
Gerrymandering
After the Supreme Court held North Carolina’s 2011 map
unconstitutional in Cooper v. Harris,191 Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis went back to the drawing board.192 They
hired Dr. Thomas Hofeller, the same districting expert who
aided them in drawing the 2011 map.193 Representative Lewis
and Senator Rucho instructed Dr. Hofeller to use precinct-level
election results to create a map that would ensure maintenance
of the state congressional delegation’s partisan balance, which,
as elected under the racially gerrymandered plan, included ten
Republicans and three Democrats.194 Dr. Hofeller was to do all
of this while moving a small number of district lines to cure the
relied too heavily on the references to race made by the leaders of the 2011
redistricting to find that race was the predominant motivator for District 12’s
boundaries).
189. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 257 (explaining that because
“race . . . correlate[d] closely with political behavior” the presence of “a
modicum of evidence” that race was a factor in drawing district lines was not
enough to show a constitutional violation).
190. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
191. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
192. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 805 (M.D.N.C.
2018) (“Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho again took charge of drawing
the remedial districting plan.”).
193. Id; see Hansi Lo Wang, Deceased GOP Strategist’s Daughter Makes
Files Public that Republicans Wanted Sealed, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 5, 2020),
https://perma.cc/V26K-623S (discussing files found on Dr. Hofeller’s hard
drives that were used to create the North Carolina congressional district
maps). The Google Drive folders with Dr. Hofeller’s daughter’s copies of the
hard drives referenced in this article have been taken down since the
publication of this source.
194. Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 805.
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racial gerrymander of the 2011 map.195 Rucho and Lewis took
heed of what the Supreme Court instructed in prior redistricting
litigation: majority-minority districts were not a requirement of
compliance with the VRA,196 mentions of race as a motivator in
redistricting could render a map unconstitutional,197 and
partisan gerrymanders, while perhaps disfavored, were
upheld.198
Among the criterion Senator Rucho, Representative Lewis,
and Dr. Hofeller cited to govern 2016 redistricting map were:
equal population, contiguity, political data, compactness, and
partisan advantage.199 The partisan advantages Republican
leadership sought were specific and direct.200 During the
redistricting process, Representative Lewis stated that he
“proposed that [the Committee] draw the maps to give a
partisan advantage to 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats because
[he] d[id] not believe it . . . possible to draw a map with 11
Republicans and 2 Democrats.”201 The 2016 redistricting map
worked as Rucho and Lewis had hoped. In the 2016 election

195. See id. (“Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho instructed Dr.
Hofeller ‘to change as few’ of the district lines in the 2011 Plan as possible in
remedying the racial gerrymander.”).
196. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1472.
197. See id. at 1497 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority relied
on the references to race made by the leaders of the 2011 redistricting to find
that race, not political behavior, was the predominant motivator for the 2011
map).
198. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234, 257–58 (2001) (reversing the district
court’s finding that District 12 was a racial gerrymander and finding the
district boundaries were drawn to achieve partisan goals); Charles &
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 151, at 1578 (referring to partisan justifications
for gerrymandering as a “safe harbor of sorts for the states when they [draw]
majority-minority districts”).
199. See Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 807–08 (listing the criteria
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis proposed to govern the 2016
redistricting process).
200. Id. at 808 (indicating that Republicans drew the district boundaries
to achieve a specific goal of a ten-three majority).
201. Id. (quoting Representative Lewis).
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Republican candidates won ten out of thirteen seats and the
2018 election yielded almost identical results.202
Common Cause (a non-profit organization), the North
Carolina Democratic Party, and fourteen individual voters sued
Rucho and Lewis to challenge the 2016 map.203 The plaintiffs
claimed the 2016 congressional districting maps were
“unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders” in violation of the
First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution.204 After a four-day trial, the
three-judge district court unanimously found that the 2016 map
was a partisan gerrymander which violated the Equal
Protection Clause and Article I of the Constitution. 205 The
majority of the panel also found that the plan violated the First
Amendment by “retaliating against supporters of Democratic
candidates on the basis of their political beliefs.”206
The case reached the Supreme Court, but the Court
remanded for a determination on whether the plaintiffs had
standing to bring their claims.207 The district court concluded
that the plaintiffs had standing and again found that the 2016
maps were partisan gerrymanders in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.208
202. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491–92 (2019) (noting that
in the 2018 election the Republican party initially won ten seats, but that the
N.C. State Board of Elections called for a new election in one of those districts
after allegations of fraud).
203. See id. at 2492 (describing the procedural history of this case).
Plaintiffs from Maryland brought similar claims based on the Maryland
congressional map, which were consolidated with the North Carolina claims.
Id. For the sake of continuity, this Note will examine only the North Carolina
claims, although the Court’s reasoning on justiciability applies to both.
204. Id. at 2491.
205. Id. at 2492 (citing Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587
(M.D.N.C. 2018)).
206. Id.
207. See id. (citing Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d. 777
(M.D.N.C. 2018)).
208. See id. (“On the merits, the court found that ‘the General Assembly’s
predominant intent was to discriminate against voters who supported or were
likely to support non-Republican candidates,’ and to ‘entrench Republican
candidates’ through widespread cracking and packing of Democratic voters.”

Dalessio.PostBluelines.docx (Do Not Delete)

SAY THE MAGIC WORDS

1/15/2021 4:54 PM

1941

However, when the case returned to the Supreme Court, the
Court did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.209 In
Rucho, for the first time, the Court was able to assemble a
majority on the issue of whether partisan gerrymandering is
justiciable in the federal courts.210 Ultimately, the Court
answered this questioning in the negative, holding that partisan
gerrymandering is not justiciable in federal court.211
To reach its conclusion, the Court applied the political
question doctrine, which limits the federal courts to deciding
only Article III “Cases” and “Controversies”212 that are judicial
in nature.213 Under the political question doctrine, issues that
are “entrusted to one of the political branches or [involve] no
judicially enforceable rights”214 are beyond the jurisdictional
reach of the federal courts.215 “Among the political question
cases the Court has identified are those that lack ‘judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
[them].’”216 According to the majority, claims of partisan
gerrymandering fall within this category.217

(quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d. 777, 883–84 (M.D.N.C.
2018))).
209. Id. at 2491 (conceding that the maps at issue were highly partisan
but stating that the issue was whether the lower courts had “appropriately
exercised [their] judicial power when they found them unconstitutional”).
210. See id. at 2506–07 (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”);
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion)
(assembling only a four-justice plurality holding that partisan
gerrymandering lacks judicially manageable standards).
211. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07 (holding that partisan
gerrymandering is beyond the reach of the federal courts).
212. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
213. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2493–94 (2019).
214. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277.
215. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (explaining that political questions are
“outside the courts’ competence and therefore beyond the courts’ jurisdiction”
(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))).
216. See id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
217. See id. at 2507 (“Federal judges have no license to reallocate political
power between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of
authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct their
decisions.”).
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The Court went on to discuss the long history of
gerrymandering in the United States and the frustration with
the practice dating back to the Colonial era.218 Based on that
history the Court stated,
The Framers were aware of electoral districting problems
and considered what to do about them. They settled on a
characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state
legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal
Congress. . . . At no point was there a suggestion that the
federal courts had a role to play.219

However, the Court, citing Shaw I, was careful to clarify that
there is a role for the federal judiciary in adjudicating claims of
racial gerrymandering.220
The problem that the Court contended with in Rucho is that
some level of partisan gerrymandering is justified under the
Constitution, as opposed to OPOV violations and racial
gerrymandering claims,221 which are always invalid.222 Rather
than asking whether a state has engaged in partisan
gerrymandering, the Court was asked to answer whether
“political gerrymandering has gone too far.”223
After discussing its attempts224 to create a standard to
measure when “political gerrymandering has gone too far,” and
the multitude of standards proposed by the plaintiffs and the

218. See id. at 2494–95 (describing the history of gerrymandering and
Congress’ efforts to limit partisan gerrymandering).
219. Id. at 2496.
220. See id. at 2496–97 (noting that the federal courts may also decide
one-person, one-vote claims under Wesbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 (1964)).
221. See supra Part II.
222. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (“[W]hile it is illegal for a jurisdiction to
depart from the one-person, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial discrimination
in districting, ‘a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political
gerrymandering.’” (quoting Cromartie I, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999))).
223. See id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004) (plurality
opinion)).
224. See id. at 2497–98 (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973);
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); and Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,
272–73 (2004) as examples of the Court’s fractured attempts to resolve the
issues of justiciability and develop a standard by which to adjudicate partisan
gerrymandering).
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dissent,225 the Court concluded that even though “[e]xcessive
partisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem
unjust. . . . [P]artisan gerrymandering claims present political
questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”226 After its
many attempts to untangle the partisan and racial threads
bound up in North Carolina’s redistricting process, the Court
finally threw in the towel, at least with regard to the “safe
harbor”227 of politically motivated gerrymandering.228
Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, warning that without a judicial check
on partisan gerrymandering politicians will be able to “entrench
themselves in office against voters’ preferences . . . [and]
irreparably damage our system of government.”229 In Justice
Kagan’s view, there are manageable standards that would allow
judicial intervention in the “worst-of-the-worst cases of
democratic subversion” without impermissibly interfering with
a state’s redistricting priorities.230
The
dissent
stressed
that
the
voters—not
politicians—should decide who is elected to serve in office.231
Specifically, the dissent took issue with Representative Lewis’
statement: “I think electing Republicans is better than electing
Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster what I think is

225. See id. at 2502 (rejecting a test that would require challengers to show
a predominant purpose was to dilute the voting strength of a political party
and that the subordination is likely to persist in subsequent elections under
the map at issue, before allowing defendants to show another legitimate
purpose for the districting).
226. Id. at 2506–07.
227. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 151, at 1578.
228. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
229. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“For the first time ever, this Court refuses to remedy a
constitutional violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial
capabilities.”).
230. Id. at 2509, 2516 (suggesting a standard to measure partisan
gerrymandering used by some states that “takes as its baseline a State’s own
criteria of fairness, apart from partisan gain. And . . . requiring plaintiffs to
make
difficult
showings
relating
to
both
purpose
and
effects . . . invalidates . . . only the most extreme[] partisan gerrymanders”).
231. See id. at 2510 (arguing that the American people should decide who
will represent their interests).
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better for the country.”232 More troubling still was that the plan
worked so well—the Republican supermajorities that resulted
from the 2016 and 2018 elections were won with only 53 percent
and 50 percent of the state-wide vote in, respectively.233 The
credit for this precision comes from modern technology that
gerrymandering map-drawers of the Framers’ era could not
have imagined, undercutting the majority’s arguments
regarding
the
historical
treatment
of
partisan
gerrymandering.234
The dissent went on to frame the problem that the majority
left in its wake: the failure to provide a remedy for “grievous
harm to democratic governance and flagrant infringements on
individuals’ [constitutional] rights.”235 What the dissent did not
discuss is the problem at the threshold of the North Carolina
gerrymandering claims: where is the line between partisan and
racial gerrymandering in the wake of Rucho? The Rucho
decision, if left unchecked, creates the “magic words” test that
Justice Beasley of the North Carolina Supreme Court cautioned
in Dickson v. Rucho and that the Middle District of North
Carolina discussed in Harris v. McCrory, allowing state
legislatures to hide racial motivation by sanitizing the
legislative redistricting record of references to race.236 With
Rucho’s holding that partisan gerrymandering is nonjusticiable
firmly in place, the stakes in the initial determination between
racial and partisan gerrymandering become far higher, and the

232. Id. (citing Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 808
(M.D.N.C. 2018)).
233. See id. at 2510–11 (characterizing the North Carolina and Maryland
maps as “voter-proof”).
234. See id. at 2512–13 (“Mapmakers now have access to more granular
data about party preference and voting behavior than ever before. . . . These
are not your grandfather’s—let alone the Framers’—gerrymanders.”).
235. Id. at 2515.
236. See Dickson v. Rucho, 766 S.E.2d. 238, 269 (N.C. 2014) (Beasley, J.,
dissenting) (“To allow this serpentine district, which follows the I-85 corridor
between Mecklenburg and Guilford Counties, to be drafted for political
advantage . . . creates a ‘magic words’ threshold.”); Harris v. McCrory, 159 F.
Supp. 3d. 600, 622 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (indicating that reliance on the
map-drawers’ purported partisan rationale would create the “magic words”
test warned of in Dickson (quoting Dickson, 766 S.E.2d at 269))).
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incentive to “cry partisan” in an attempt to avoid judicial review
becomes ever stronger.237
V.

A Historically Informed Solution: Flowers v. Mississippi

In order to ensure that evidence of partisanship does not
become a shield to insulate partisan redistricting plans that
have a strong, or even predominant, racial component from
judicial review, the Supreme Court should develop a standard
by which it can evaluate partisan gerrymandering challenges in
states with histories of racial gerrymandering.238 The Court’s
reasoning from its decision in Flowers v. Mississippi, decided six
days prior to Rucho v. Common Cause, provides a useful starting
point for creating a workable standard.
Flowers was a murder case.239 Specifically, it was an appeal
from Curtis Flowers’ sixth trial for the same crime tried by the
same lead prosecutor.240 The first three trials resulted in
conviction, but all three were overturned by the Mississippi
Supreme Court due to prosecutorial misconduct in the jury
selection process.241 In at least two of the first three trials, the
Mississippi Supreme Court found that the prosecutor
discriminated on the basis of race in peremptory challenges of
Black jurors.242 The fourth and fifth trials ended in hung
juries.243 And in the sixth trial, at issue before the Supreme
Court, Flowers again argued that the State “violated Batson [v.

237. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2522–23 (2019) (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (noting that the leaders of the North Carolina Legislature “felt
free to openly proclaim their intent to entrench their party in office” because
they “thought their actions could not be attacked in court”).
238. See supra Part III (describing the need for a threshold test before a
claim of gerrymandering can be dismissed based on the political question
doctrine).
239. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2019) (explaining
that Curtis Flowers allegedly murdered four people in Winona, Mississippi).
240. Id. at 2234–35.
241. See id. (describing the procedural posture as this case came before the
U.S. Supreme Court).
242. See id. (indicating that the prosecution had engaged in racial
discrimination to eliminate Black jurors from jury service).
243. Id. at 2235.
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Kentucky]244 in exercising peremptory strikes against Black
prospective jurors.”245
The Supreme Court reversed Flowers’ conviction, finding
that the State’s pattern of striking Black potential jurors
(forty-one out of forty-two potential jurors over the course of six
trials), disparate questioning of Black and White potential
jurors, and striking a particular Black juror who was similarly
situated to a White juror justified reversal.246 In reaching their
conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the State’s history of
employing its “peremptory strikes to remove as many [B]lack
perspective jurors as possible.”247 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kavanaugh stated: “The State’s actions in the first four
trials necessarily inform our assessment of the State’s intent
going into Flowers’ sixth trial. We cannot ignore that history. We
cannot take that history out of the case.”248 In the majority’s
view, the trial judge in Flowers’ case, although aware of the
State’s history, “did not sufficiently account for the history when
considering Flowers’ Batson claim.”249 So, less than one week
before the decision in Rucho was handed down, the Court
acknowledged the importance of a state’s history of racial
discrimination to justify its finding of discrimination in the case

244. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (finding that “the
State’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges[] is
subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause”). Under Batson, a
prosecutor may not strike a juror because of “their race or on the assumption
that [B]lack jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s
case against a [B]lack defendant.” Id.
245. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235.
246. See id. at 2251 (holding that “all of the relevant facts and
circumstances taken together” established sufficient grounds for reversal).
247. See id. at 2245–46 (“[O]ur review of the history of the prosecutor’s
peremptory strikes in Flowers’ first four trials strongly supports the
conclusion that his use of peremptory strikes in Flowers’ sixth trial was
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.”).
248. Id. at 2246 (emphasis added).
249. Id.
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before it.250 This reliance on history is equally applicable to the
North Carolina gerrymandering saga.251
The Court’s examination of a Mississippi prosecutor’s
record of racial discrimination may seem to have little to do with
a standard to resolve a problem related to vote dilution.
However, there are at least two similarities. First, the injury
claimed by Curtis Flowers has the same constitutional source as
the injury claimed by plaintiffs in a racial or partisan
gerrymandering case—the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.252 The Court in Flowers recognized a
second similarity: “Other than voting, serving on a jury is the
most substantial opportunity that most citizens have in the
democratic process.”253 Similar democratic and constitutional
values, therefore, are at stake.
The majority in Flowers gave a brief history of the racial
manipulation of jury selection pre-Batson.254 Although the Civil
Rights Act of 1875255 and the Supreme Court’s decision in
Strauder v. West Virginia256 had long prohibited discrimination
against potential jurors based on race, prosecutors continued to
use their unlimited freedom to exercise peremptory strikes to

250. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
251. Cf. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (indicating that
extraordinary protections for voting rights may be justified where there is a
demonstrated, established, and continuing pattern of discrimination with
regard to voting rights).
252. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2019) (“Under the
Equal Protection Clause . . . even a single instance of race discrimination
against a prospective juror is impermissible.”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139
S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the practice
of packing and cracking voters based on race violates the Equal Protection
Clause); Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (concluding that plaintiffs
challenging congressional districting map as a racial gerrymander under the
Equal Protection Clause could state a claim by showing that a facially neutral
law cannot be explained without regard to race).
253. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407
(1991)) (emphasis added).
254. Id. at 2238–42.
255. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 243).
256. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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eliminate Black jurors until the Court decided Batson in 1986.257
The Court described the use of peremptory strikes to restrict
potential Black jurors from jury service as a “more covert and
less overt” method of achieving the same result—eliminating
Black jurors from the jury panel.258
The history of racial gerrymandering and subsequent
transition to partisan gerrymandering discussed in Parts III
and IV of this Note may similarly be described as a move from
more overt racial gerrymandering to a covert method of
achieving similar results through race-conscious, but not
facially race-motivated partisan gerrymandering.259 In the same
way an individual prosecutor can obscure racial bias behind
peremptory strikes,260 state legislatures can hide a racially
discriminatory purpose or effect behind language and reasoning
that emphasizes partisanship over race.261 These similar
degradations of the rights of people of color in the United States
warrant similar treatment.262 The Supreme Court could and
should follow its logic from Flowers and consider a state’s recent
and long-standing history of racial gerrymandering when
confronted with the defense that gerrymandering is based on
partisan, rather than racial, motivations.263
One method of taking that history into account would be to
create a presumption of racial gerrymandering applicable to

257. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238–42 (indicating that after Strauder
held a West Virginia law forbidding people of color from service as jurors
unconstitutional, prosecutors were able to use peremptory strikes to achieve
the same result).
258. Id. at 2240.
259. See supra Parts III, IV.
260. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2240 (explaining that prosecutors’ use of
peremptory challenges put discrimination behind the courthouse doors).
261. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 151, at 1585; cf. Cooper v.
Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1486 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court’s decision in Cromartie II imposed
a requirement that individuals challenging a congressional map put forth an
alternative map that would achieve the same partisan balance without any
racial effect).
262. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
263. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2246 (discussing the lower court’s failure to
consider the history of the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes in evaluating
Flowers’ claim of a Batson violation).
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states with a history of racial gerrymandering.264 The
presumption would function as follows: First, the challengers to
a district map would present evidence that the state has a
history of past racial gerrymandering, thereby establishing a
prima facie case for racial gerrymandering.265 The
state-defendant would be required to overcome that
presumption by putting forth evidence that partisanship was
not a pretext for race, in purpose or effect, before a federal court
could decline to hear the case based on the decision in Rucho.266
The use of presumptions is not new or novel to the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence.267 This type of test is reminiscent of the
approach the Supreme Court takes in adjudicating violations of

264. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 642–44 (1993) (creating a presumption of
invalidity where a congressional districting plan is motivated by race); see also
Pitts, supra note 8, at 261–62 (suggesting that “under the right circumstances,
racial gerrymandering doctrine could curb partisan gerrymandering . . . [by
making] a redistricting actor . . . less inclined to engage in partisan
gerrymandering just knowing that . . . [the racial gerrymandering doctrine] is
available to his or her political opponents”).
265. Cf. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(describing the burden of establishing a prima facie case in employment
discrimination law suits as “not onerous,” requiring plaintiff to show “by a
preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for
which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise
to unlawful discrimination”).
266. Cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 170–71 (2015) (shifting the
burden to the defendant-town to put forth evidence that a content-based
regulation on speech was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest in order to defeat a presumption of invalidity for content-based
regulations under the First Amendment).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–66 (1996)
(stating that the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses can be dispelled by clear and convincing
evidence that the prosecution was motivated by race or other improper
purpose); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (explaining that after
plaintiffs prove their prima facie case for racial discrimination, the burden
shifts to defendants to rebut the presumption of constitutional invalidity);
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (“Establishment of the prima facie case . . . creates a
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the
employee. If the [factfinder] believes the plaintiff’s evidence, and if the
employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff . . . .”).
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the Equal Protection Clause based on racial discrimination.268
Such an approach is justified because, if challengers are able to
make a showing that a map drawn to achieve ostensibly
partisan goals has the purpose or effect of diluting the voting
strength of minority voters, the claim ceases to be one based on
partisanship and becomes a claim of racial discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause.269
This test would allow prospective plaintiffs to bring a claim
in federal court alleging racial gerrymandering and to support
that claim with a description of the state’s history of
race-motivated redistricting. If the state-defendant then
attempted to argue that the case should be dismissed by alleging
a partisan purpose under Rucho, it would first have to overcome
a presumption that the classification was based on race rather
than party affiliation.270 Drawing from the Batson-Flowers
reasoning, a defendant should not overcome the presumption by
the mere assertion that there is a correlation between race and
party affiliation.271 Rather, under this test, the state-defendant
would be required to put forth a record that is justifiable, in light
of the state’s history, with priorities other than manipulation of
the racial composition of districts.272
268. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642–44 (stating that government actions that
discriminate based on race, either facially or in purpose and effect, are
presumptively invalid under the Equal Protection Clause).
269. See id. at 645 (“[D]istrict lines . . . drawn for the purpose of separating
voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption.”).
270. Cf. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 151, at 1580 (arguing that
attempting to divine whether redistricting was based on race or partisanship
is “quixotic at best” due to the high correlation between race and party
affiliation).
271. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2241 (2019) (“[A]
prosecutor may not rebut a claim of discrimination ‘by stating merely that he
challenged jurors of the defendant’s race on the assumption . . . that they
would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.’” (quoting
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986))); Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer,
supra note 151, at 1580 (“[I]n our modern era, race and partisanship are highly
correlated.”).
272. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241 (stating that Batson does not allow a
prosecutor to escape judicial scrutiny for peremptory strikes of Black jurors
based on an assumption that such jurors would not impartially evaluate a case
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The Flowers Court’s use of history is instructive in the
application of the test this Note proposes. As previously
discussed, Flowers, Rucho, and the long line of cases preceding
Rucho were brought under the Equal Protection Clause.273
Therefore, the use of history and practice in evaluating such a
claim is not foreign to the Supreme Court’s equal protection
analysis and, just as in the case of peremptory strikes, the
historical background surrounding a state’s record of
redistricting challenges should not be ignored.274
Additionally, a test tying a state’s voting rights history
together with a presumption of racial gerrymandering would
not upset the existing jurisprudence governing voting rights. As
was discussed in Part II of this Note, the Supreme Court refused
to uphold the coverage formula under Section 4 of the VRA in
Shelby County v. Holder because, while the formula had been
justified by racial discrimination in the pre-1965 history of the
Act, Congress had not provided recent history supporting a
continued need for disparate treatment of different states with
regards to voting legislation.275 However, as the case study
presented in Part III of this Note exhibits, there is not only a
long-standing history of racial discrimination in North
Carolina,276 the last quarter century is rife with examples of
racial gerrymandering, in addition to race-conscious partisan
gerrymandering.277 Applying the Court’s logic in Shelby County
with a Black defendant (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986)));
see also Parsons, supra note 31, at 1164 (listing “compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions and geographic boundaries” as “neutral”
redistricting criteria).
273. See cases cited supra note 252 and accompanying text.
274. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2246 (stressing the importance of the history
surrounding this case in reaching a conclusion).
275. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (indicating that
pre-1965 discrimination alone did not justify the coverage formula subjecting
different states to different treatment under the VRA).
276. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993) (taking note of the evidence
presented by the State of North Carolina of a “long history of official racial
discrimination in North Carolina’s political system and of pervasive racial bloc
voting”).
277. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481–82 (2017) (finding
that North Carolina’s Congressional Districts 1 and 12 were racial
gerrymanders).
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to a test that considers both recent and entrenched racial
discrimination in redistricting is, thus, not at odds with the
Court’s decision in that case.278
Additionally, a presumption of racial gerrymandering
based on a state’s history does not disturb Rucho’s holding. The
majority in Rucho was clear in acknowledging that the federal
courts have a role in adjudicating claims of racial
gerrymandering.279 The Rucho majority rejected tests to
determine when partisan gerrymandering goes too far,280 but
did not speak to federal courts’ ability to make a distinction
between racial gerrymanders and partisan gerrymanders.281
Practically, the Rucho decision necessitates a determination
that gerrymandering is in fact based on partisan advantage and
not race.282 Applying the presumption of racial gerrymandering
to the facts at issue in Rucho with an eye toward North
Carolina’s deeply rooted history of racial gerrymandering283
would have forced the Supreme Court to engage with all that
was at stake in Rucho and to make a definitive determination
that partisanship was not a cloak to obscure a racially
discriminatory purpose.284

278. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557 (“Our country has changed [since
the VRA was enacted in 1965], and while any racial discrimination in voting
is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy
that problem speaks to current conditions.”). This Note takes no position on
whether Shelby County was correctly decided; it merely notes that the
framework proposed in this Note is consistent with the Court’s decision.
279. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2488 (2019) (stating
that claims of racial gerrymandering are subject to federal judicial review).
280. See id. at 2502 (rejecting balancing tests that attempted to determine
acceptable levels of partisanship).
281. See id. at 2498 (indicating that partisan gerrymanders are
nonjusticiable because it would be inappropriate for the federal courts to
interfere with the political process).
282. See Ely, supra note 5, at 498 (asserting that partisan and racial
motivations for gerrymandering are often “inextricably intertwined”).
283. See cases cited supra note 6 (displaying North Carolina’s record of
racial and partisan gerrymandering challenges over the past quarter century).
284. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If left
unchecked, gerrymanders like the ones here may irreparably damage our
system of government.”).
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The Test Applied to the Facts of Rucho v. Common Cause

Rucho began with the Middle District of North Carolina’s
decision, which recounted a detailed history of the racial and
partisan gerrymandering claims in North Carolina.285 In
particular, the opinion focused on the instructions
Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho gave Dr. Hofeller to
guide him in drawing the remedial plan, after the Supreme
Court struck down the 2011 plan in Cooper as a racial
gerrymander.286 The instructions, which were given orally and
never reduced to a writing, boiled down to two main points: (1)
Dr. Hofeller was to use granular political data to maintain the
partisan distribution in the State’s congressional delegation of
ten Republicans and three Democrats and; (2) he was to
“‘change as few’ of the district lines in the 2011 Plan as possible
in remedying the racial gerrymander.”287 The Middle District of
North Carolina’s opinion also noted that—pursuant to the 2016
Rucho-Lewis-Hofeller plan—both District 1 and District 12
retained at least 50 percent of the population as in their
corresponding 2011 racially gerrymandered version.288
The Supreme Court in Rucho thus had evidence before it
that the primary drafter of the challenged map successfully
285. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 801–03 (M.D.N.C.
2018) (“Over the last 30 years, North Carolina voters repeatedly have asked
state and federal courts to pass judgment on the constitutionality of the
congressional districting plans drawn by their state legislators.”).
286. See id. at 803–08 (detailing the process Rucho, Lewis, and Hofeller
used to effectuate the 2016 map); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1481–82
(2017) (labeling the 2011 redistricting plan a racial gerrymander with respect
to Districts 1 and 12).
287. See Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 805 (“Representative Lewis
and Senator Rucho further instructed Dr. Hofeller that he should use that
political data to draw a map that would maintain the existing partisan
makeup of the state’s congressional delegation, which, [w]as elected under the
racially gerrymandered [2011] plan . . . .”).
288. See id. at 809
In accordance with the Chairs [sic] goals of protecting incumbents
and preserving the “cores” of the districts in the 2011 [racially
gerrymandered] plan, 10 of the 13 districts (Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 10, and 12) in the 2016 Plan retain[ed] at least 50 percent of the
population in their corresponding 2011 version. (emphasis added).
Supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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followed instructions to keep as much of the racially
gerrymandered 2011 map in place as possible.289 In addition,
recently revealed files from Dr. Hofeller’s computer, which he
used to draw the map challenged in Rucho, demonstrate that
race was considered in drawing the district lines. 290 Specifically,
Dr. Hofeller’s files show that he created detailed maps that
“tracked race, voting patterns and addresses of tens of
thousands of North Carolina college students” in conjunction
with the 2016 redistricting plan.291 These files also show that a
congressional district line was drawn to divide North Carolina
A&T State University, the nation’s largest historically Black
college, in half “so precisely that it all but guarantees it will be
represented in Congress by two Republicans for years to
come.”292
Had the Rucho Court started with a presumption of racial
gerrymandering, this evidence would likely have been sufficient
for the Court to uphold that presumption, even in the face of the
State’s evidence that the map was governed by race-neutral
partisan districting principles.293 Thus, under this test the 2016
map would have been subject to the strict racial gerrymandering
analysis established by the cases discussed in Part III of this
289. See Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 805 (describing the overlap
between the 2011 racially gerrymandered plan and the 2016 plan drawn for
partisan advantage).
290. See David Daley, The Secret Files of the Master of Modern Republican
Gerrymandering, NEW YORKER (Sept. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/C6XY-RP97
(discussing the information obtained by the New Yorker from Dr. Hofeller’s
emails and computer files).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 807–08 (indicating that the
Republicans’ stated criteria governing the 2016 redistricting plan were limited
to: equal population, contiguity, political data, partisan advantage,
compactness, incumbency, and eliminating the snake-like quality of District
12); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] governing political coalition has an incentive to prevent
changes in the existing balance of voting power. When voting is racially
polarized, efforts by the ruling party to pursue that incentive ‘will inevitably
discriminate against a racial group.’” (quoting Stephen Ansolabehere et al.,
Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election:
Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126
HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 209 (2013))).
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Note, rather than being dismissed as a political question.294
Such analysis would have prompted the Court to probe deeper
into the intentions of the map-drawers to ensure the 2016 plan
did not compromise minority voters’ constitutional rights.295
VI. Conclusion
The Rucho decision prohibits the federal judiciary from
adjudicating
potential
violations of a fundamental
constitutional right.296 The majority in Rucho suggests that the
solution to extreme partisan gerrymanders may lie with state
constitutions, legislatures, and judiciaries.297 Specifically, the
majority lauded states that have implemented nonpartisan
redistricting commissions.298 However, when the rubber meets
the road, there are practical challenges to the implementation
of such commissions.299 Chief among those challenges is that
asking a party in power to enact a law establishing a
nonpartisan redistricting commission is asking individual
politicians and political parties to act against their own

294. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2505–06 (2019)
(holding that partisan gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question).
295. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[Voting may be
regarded as] a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all
rights.”).
296. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the
gerrymanders at issue in the case as violating “the most fundamental” of the
challengers’ constitutional rights).
297. See id. at 2507 (majority opinion) (describing the various ways in
which states have addressed excessive partisanship in their redistricting
plans); see also Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 N.C. Super.
LEXIS 56, at *413–20 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019) (striking down the map
that was at issue in Rucho under the North Carolina Constitution’s voting
protections, which the court found to be more stringent than the federal
constitutional protections). Although the North Carolina State courts found
that the map at issue in Rucho violated the State constitution, the issue
presented and analyzed by this Note, namely the potential shield from federal
judicial review, remains unaddressed.
298. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (stating that the Court’s decision “does
not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering” and suggesting that states
restrict partisan power in the redistricting process through legislation).
299. See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
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interests.300 This very tension between long-term electoral
fairness and short-term partisan advantage is playing out in
Virginia,301 another state with a history of racial
gerrymandering.302
Although it appears clear that the electorate cannot trust
politicians to police themselves, Rucho is the law of the land for
the foreseeable future.303 As such, the issue presented by this
Note is vital to ensuring that a “magic words” test does not
dilute the voting strength of minority citizens and subsequently

300. See Parsons, supra note 31, at 1136–37 (arguing that partisanship is
a personal interest of politicians and political parties, rather than a state
interest for the purpose of constitutional analysis).
301. See Laura Vozzella, Some Virginia Democrats Want to Hit the Brakes
on Nonpartisan Redistricting Plan, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2019, 12:32 PM),
https://perma.cc/ATA6-EVZL (“With their party in control of the State House
and Senate for the first time in a generation, [Democratic] opponents of [the
redistricting commission] are feeling empowered and saying they want to hit
the brakes.”); Gregory S. Schneider, Virginians to Vote on Proposed
Amendment for Bipartisan Redistricting Commission, WASH. POST (Oct. 1,
2020, 3:26 PM), https://perma.cc/X9QD-QUGU (noting that the Virginia
Democratic Party, which currently holds the majority of seats in the Virginia
General Assembly, officially opposes the ballot measure that would create a
nonpartisan redistricting panel); Robert McCartney, Virginia Democrats Face
Choice Between Idealism and Revenge in Vote on Gerrymandering, WASH. POST
(Oct. 5, 2020 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/GF8R-DB8N (quoting Virginia House
of Delegates member Marcia S. “Cia” Price (D-Newport News) as saying
“[Instituting a nonpartisan redistricting committee] would not be the first
time or only issue where Democrats are called suckers”). “The Democrats’
temptation to keep all the power for themselves is strengthened by their
awareness that the Republicans did not hesitate to wield theirs to maximum
advantage following the last two censuses, especially after 2010.” Id. Virginia
voters ultimately approved an amendment to the state constitution creating a
bipartisan redistricting commission. Rachel Weiner, Virginians Approve
Turning Redistricting Over to Bipartisan Commission, WASH. POST (Nov. 4,
2020, 9:59 AM), https://perma.cc/9AXF-8FC8.
302. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F. Supp. 3d
128, 137 (E.D. Va. 2018) (holding that “race predominated over traditional
districting factors in the construction” of eleven challenged districts and that
the Virginia legislature’s use of race was not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest).
303. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (“Partisan gerrymandering rests on an
instinct that groups with a certain level of political support should enjoy a
commensurate level of political power and influence.”); Vonzella, supra note
301 (implying that the party in power will seek to hold that power).
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obscure that dilution from judicial scrutiny.304 In states with
histories of racial gerrymandering, this concern is even more
pressing.305 The solution presented in this Note places an
additional layer of protection between claims of non-justiciable
partisan gerrymandering and the history of racial subjugation
that often lies beneath, and therefore prevents Rucho from
opening the door to repetition of an unjust history.306

304. But see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (“Nor
does our conclusion [that partisan gerrymandering presents a nonjusticiable
political question] condemn complaints about districting to echo into a void.”).
305. See supra Part V (arguing that a state’s history of racial
gerrymandering provides vital context to a claim of partisan gerrymandering).
306. See supra Part V.

